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“Surveying History at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” 
 
I. Introduction  
 
There now exists a large body of scholarship assessing international and national 
criminal trials for alleged mass violations of international humanitarian law.  One debate 
in this literature evaluates the degree to which these trials have examined the origins 
and causes of violations, and provided an accurate historical record of the context of the 
crimes.  By and large, historians and legal commentators are critical of law’s ability to 
engage in historical inquiry.  Liberal legalists have maintained that historical discussion 
of the underlying factors in a conflict defeats the ends of justice, understood as a fair 
hearing of the charges against one individual (Arendt 1965; Todorov 1996).  Scholars 
from the law and society tradition have highlighted the distinctive characteristics of 
history and law, arguing that law and history are incompatible since they employ 
distinctive epistemological methods (Evans 2002; Rousso 2000; Sadkovich 2002); that 
law’s own rules and procedures create a reductive template that actually distorts 
historical and social realities (Golsan 2000b); that law’s minimal regard for context 
means it is inevitably partial with respect to the historical record (Geertz 1983; Bloxham 
2001; Marrus 1997; Minow 1998; Mertus 2000) or that the courtroom is just plain 
boring in its excessive concern with meticulous procedural rectitude and therefore 
represents the wrong platform for revealing historical truths (Osiel 2000).  A few 
countervailing views have emerged, and Lawrence Douglas (2001) has maintained that 
at Nuremberg newly minted legal categories propelled historical inquiry.  By and large, 
though, the majority have formed a low opinion of law’s capacity to conduct historical 
analysis. 
 
With the recent emergence of an array of international criminal justice institutions 
including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, established 
1993), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994) and the International 
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Criminal Court (ICC,  2002), new discussions have coalesced around the case law and 
jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals (Cassese 2003, Dörmann 2003, Schabas 
2001, 2009), the international geo-politics of the Tribunals (Hazan 2004, Moghalu 2008, 
Peskin 2008), the impact (or lack thereof) of the Tribunals in the countries and regions 
concerned (Tosid 2007, Clarke 2009), and the effect of legal judgments on survivors of 
violence (Nettelfield 2010, Stover 2005).  Accounts of the internal working of 
international courts have also started to be published, either in memoirs by key actors 
(Goldstone 2000, Del Ponte 2009) or in ethnographic studies by social scientists (Hagan 
2003).  As yet, there has been very little evaluation of the historical accounts of armed 
conflicts produced by contemporary international justice institutions, and what there is 
has tended to focus on the judgments written by judges at the end of cases (Donia 2004, 
Turkovid 2003, Wilson 2005, 2007).   
 
While providing important insights on the place of historical evidence in published case 
law, these discussions can only infer conclusions about the relevance and weight given 
to historical evidence in reaching a judgment.  Despite some excellent work in the early 
stages of the Tribunal (Hagan 2003), there is still precious little information on the 
international criminal legal proceedings as a dynamic decision-making process, and on 
the complex interactions between the strategies and understandings of the legal actors. 
As Jens Meierhenrich (2008:702) observes, while we have a solid grasp of the 
jurisprudential dimensions of international courts and tribunals, we know “close to 
nothing” about them as complex social institutions made up of different groups with a 
variety of goals and assumptions.  To answer our questions about the relationship 
between international law and regional histories, what is needed is empirical research 
on how prosecutors and defense attorneys strategize in their use of historical evidence 
in the Trial Chamber, and what expert witnesses called by prosecution or defense hope 
to convey in their oral testimonies or written reports.  This is the lacuna in the literature 
that this research seeks to fill. 
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By surveying key actors in cases at the ICTY, the longest functioning ad hoc tribunal, 
about their intentions, motivations and perceptions, we might arrive at a greater 
understanding of their strategies and their assessment of the overall value and influence 
of historical testimony.  Since the survey is anonymous, actors may be less constrained 
in expressing their own candid assessments than in public statements or interviews.  
Furthermore, while analysis of trial transcripts provides worthwhile information about 
how historical debates transpired in the Trial Chamber, by undertaking the discussion 
outside of the rough-and-tumble adversarial process of the courtroom, a more balanced 
evaluation might be forthcoming from the parties.  Finally, in the survey format, 
respondents are not asked to tie their responses to a specific case, and this might 
permit them to base their answers on a more global assessment of the Tribunal’s legacy 
since it began over 17 years and 161 indictments ago. As the Tribunal comes to the end 
of its term (probably in 2014), such “exit surveys” of former Tribunal staff and defense 
team members can comprise an integral part of the appraisal of the ICTY’s work.  
 
In order to augment what can be learned from case law and trial transcripts, and to 
furnish new insights into the perspective of legal actors with respect to the debate on 
legal histories of mass crimes, we turned to three categories of participants in the 
process—ICTY staff members, members of defense teams, and external expert 
consultants/witnesses—with the following three overarching themes in mind: 
 Motivations: What do prosecutors and defense attorneys seek to achieve by 
including historical evidence in a case?  How do they use such evidence to build 
their theory of a case? How do they understand the intentions of the opposing 
party?  What relationship do they see between historical evidence and other 
aspects of the legal case and other forms of evidence?  Are international trials 
more or less conducive than their national counterparts to admitting historical 
testimony? 
 Courtroom Consequences: How is historical evidence received by the judges?  
How do judges decide between opposing views of history and are they perceived 
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as tilting towards one party or the other in their deliberation?  Is oral testimony 
more effective than written, and are defense and prosecution witnesses 
perceived to be equally well prepared? 
 External Outcomes:  Has the Tribunal provided an adequate account of the 
origins, causes and processes of conflict in the former Yugoslavia?  Have 
historical discussions enhanced or undermined the Tribunal’s legitimacy in the 
former Yugoslavia? 
 
In designing a survey of former ICTY staff, defense team members and external expert 
consultants/witnesses on historical matters, we were attuned to areas where a 
consensus or strong divergences seemed likely.  While we understand the ICTY to be a 
‘hybrid’ international criminal tribunal that combines elements of Anglo-American 
criminal law and the Continental civil-law system, ICTY trials are still propelled by the 
adversarial process and as such, we were naturally interested in comparing the 
responses of persons working on the prosecution and defense side.  Another potential 
fault line lies between lawyers and others working within the legal process, on the one 
hand, and “non-legal” participants such as expert witnesses, who are largely based in 
academic institutions, although experts are usually called by one of the contending 
parties, rather than as independent parties by the ICTY judges. 
 
Before outlining the survey’s methods, results and analysis, it is necessary to set out the 
legal framework under which historical expert witness testimony is admitted in the ICTY 
courtroom.  Two features are worth noting here: that international criminal tribunals 
have adopted a lenient approach to admitting evidence that is more comparable to the 
civil-law system and in sharp contrast to Anglo-American common law; and second, that 
the ICTY’s approach to historical evidence changed over time, requiring written as well 
as live testimonial submissions on historical matters. 
 
 7 
Expert witness testimony at the ICTY is governed by a number of related rules of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence1, beginning with Rule 89(C): “A Chamber may admit 
any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value,” with the main grounds 
for exclusion being “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to 
ensure a fair trial *Rule 89(D)+.”  Rule 94bis authorizes either party to tender an expert 
statement, after which time the other party has thirty days to indicate whether it wishes 
to cross-examine the witness, and whether it challenges the qualifications of the witness 
and the relevance of their report, in whole or in part.   
 
Unlike in the common law tradition, international criminal courts operate without an 
explicit hearsay rule.  As in civil-law courts, there is no concern that a jury might be 
misled since there is no jury, and it is assumed that ICTY judges are competent to 
distinguish between reliable and unreliable evidence. In Tadid, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
rejected a motion filed by defense counsel seeking to exclude hearsay evidence as a 
general rule, affirming that the judges are able “by virtue of their training and 
experience, to hear evidence in the context in which it has been obtained and accord it 
appropriate weight.  Thereafter, judges determine the relevance, reliability, and 
probative value of the evidence relying upon the “context and character of the evidence 
in question.”2   The Tribunal is guided in admitting hearsay evidence “by the 
truthfulness, voluntariness and trustworthiness of the evidence.”3    
 
Over time, the ICTY became more, not less, flexible in its rules admitting expert 
evidence, in part a result of the acute pressure on the Tribunal by the United Nations 
                                                 
1 Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTY), UN Doc IT/32, adopted 11 Feb. 1994. At the time of 
writing, there have been 44 revisions to the RPE.  
2 Prosecutor v. Tadid, Decision on the Defense Motion on Hearsay. ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T .  5 
August 1996, cited in Blaskid §28.   
3  Tadid §16 
 8 
Security Council to shorten the length of trials.4  After 1998, a number of amendments 
to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence signaled a shift away from the common law 
adversarial model in the direction of the Continental civil-law system: Rule 92 bis and 
Rule 94bis permitted the submission of written statements by experts, and evidence 
could be admitted into a case without being led in the Trial Chamber and in the absence 
of cross-examination, although either adversarial party could object and request cross-
examination.  Together, Rule 92bis and Rule 94bis allowed prosecutors and defense 
attorneys to submit enormous quantities of scholarly reports, books and articles, as well 
as non-governmental organization reports, films and videos.  The documentary basis of 
cases swelled to barely-manageable proportions during this period; for instance, in 
Kordid and Čerkez the prosecution tendered 2721 exhibits, with the defense submitting 
1643 exhibits.5   
 
In 2002, the ICTY developed a “completion strategy” that subordinated the legal process 
to a strict principle of expeditiousness.6  The rise of what Máximo Langer (2005:835) 
terms the “managerial judging model” granted more authority to judges to manage 
their cases aggressively in the pre-trial and trial phases.  Rule 65ter requires prosecutors 
to file a witness list, a document list and a list of contested matters and admissions.  
Judges can select which witnesses to call and limit their testimony under rules 73bis and 
73ter.  Rule 90F&G give judges control over witness cross-examination to “avoid 
needless consumption of time.”  Trial Chamber decisions reinforced increased judicial 
authority, for instance, the Kordid decision in October 2000 prohibiting the prosecution 
from leading any evidence on “peripheral and background issues” in its rebuttal of the 
                                                 
4 ICTY Judge Patricia Wald (2001:549) wrote that the “new Rules sharply respond to the problem 
of lagging trials.” 
5 Kordid and Čerkez (IT-95-14/2) Case Information Sheet  
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/kordic.htm Last accessed 10 August, 2009. 
6 Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, U.N. Doc S/2002/678 (2002). 
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defense case. 7  Judges thus gained the means to pare down cases drastically, and 
regularly ordered prosecutors to drop a specific number of indictments or cut their 
cases by an arbitrary number such as 25-30%.8  Defense attorneys embraced these 
changes, saying that prosecutors regularly over-indicted.  When prosecutors protested, 
judges ruled that any time spent addressing an objection would be subtracted from the 
time allotted to the party making the objection.9 
  
While on the one hand, judges gained ever greater powers to restrict expert witnesses’ 
testimony and cross-examination, the new evidentiary regime allowed more latitude for 
the parties to tender background and historical evidence.  In practice, what happened in 
any given ICTY trial depended on the nature of the case, the charges against the accused 
and the inclination of the judges on the bench.  Overall, however, after 2002 
prosecutors called background expert witnesses rather less than before, and in a more 
targeted fashion, favoring instead a more conventional crime-based approach.  In the 
pre-trial phase, the judges became more interventionist, reducing the scope of 
prosecution cases and in particular, limiting expert witness testimony and historical 
discussions.   Defense cases were usually handled with a lighter touch, and defense 
counsel continued to call extensive historical expert witnesses at the ICTY. In sum, the 
role and scope of historical inquiry has varied widely during the life of the Tribunal and 
its use by the legal parties has shifted from the prosecution in the earlier phases to the 
defense as the Tribunal nears completion. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Mundis (2001:376) 
8 On 14 November 2006, the Trial Chamber reduced the time previously allotted to the 
prosecution in the Prlid case by more than a quarter.  In a Decision on 21 November 2006, the 
prosecution was given until December 4th to reduce the scope of the indictment against 
Momčilo Perisid by “at least a third.”   
9 See Prlid Trial Chamber Decision of 14 November, 2006. 
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II.  Methodology and the Survey Instrument 
 
After the survey was developed, a preliminary version was reviewed by the Center for 
Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut.  The modified version 
was tested on a focus group of six individuals who were former ICTY staff and consultant 
expert witnesses that were not included in the survey.  The focus group encouraged us 
to define more fully certain terms such as “historian” and “historical evidence”.  We 
included a fuller definition in the survey preamble and on the Internet page linked to 
the survey, which explained the rationale for the research project.  
 
The final survey questionnaire was divided into two parts. Part 1 elicited information 
about the background of respondents, the organ of the ICTY (including defense) with 
which the respondent was last associated, the form and length of the respondent’s 
participation in the work of the ICTY, the nature of the respondent’s professional 
activities at the time when s/he first became associated with the ICTY and the 
respondents’ familiarity with the former Yugoslavia and criminal justice systems prior to 
that association.  We chose not to request information regarding 
ethnic/national/religious affiliation in the Balkans; this would generally not apply to ICTY 
staff, and only to some defense attorneys and expert witnesses, and we judged that 
numbers of responses would be insufficient to support conclusions.  The primary focus 
of this investigation was rather on comparisons among the parties to the legal process, 
and between legal and non-legal actors.  Who are our respondents?  The chart below 
indicates their occupational background before their association with the Tribunal:10 
                                                 
10 Approximately 60% in the “Other” category properly belong in one of the Criminal Justice 
System categories, as a judge, prosecutor or defense attorney.  The remainder  included a 
military lawyer, a number of journalists and graduate students. 
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Where did you work prior to working for, or with, the Tribunal?
31%
5%
0%
11%
3%5%
4%
18%
7%
16%
Criminal Justice System-Defense
Attorney (31%)
Criminal Justice System-Prosecutor
(5%)
Criminal Justice System-Judge (0%)
Police (10%)
Military (3%)
National Government Agency (5%)
United Nations or International
Agency (4%)
University or College (18%)
Non-Governmental Organization
(7%)
Other (please specify) (16%)
 
Figure 1 
 
Part 2 covered the substantive issues addressed by the survey and was comprised of 36 
questions grouped under 22 headings. The format varied between multiple choice (or 
multi-value) and true-false. This was done to avoid respondent fatigue and ensure that 
as many persons as possible would complete the survey.  Although multiple choice (or 
multi-value) questions allow for more articulated results and the possibility for the 
“neutral” category to draw more responses, we judged that the benefit derived from 
varying the question format outweighed the limitations. 
 
For most topics, we balanced questions related to the prosecution and the defense; if 
one question requested evaluation of evidence led by the prosecution, another would 
request an analogous evaluation of evidence led by the defense. This was done not only 
on grounds of objectivity, but also because we anticipated, in light of the ICTY’s 
adversarial proceedings, that respondents’ perceptions of the use of historical evidence 
in those proceedings might well vary in this dimension.  The final open-ended question 
invited respondents to provide any comments that they chose.  
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Considering the highly contested nature of the Tribunal’s work and the adversarial 
character of its legal proceedings, we reflected on the ways in which we could ensure 
objectivity and neutrality. Thus, we acknowledged at least four distinct, albeit related, 
aspects of objectivity.   
 
First, the disposition and background of the investigators. It should be noted that 
Andrew Corin was employed in the Leadership Research Team of the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICTY between June 1999 and January 2008. During that time, he 
actively assisted the prosecution through participation in basic research, focused 
investigations and trial preparation. He also participated as an author of expert reports 
and, on one occasion, as an expert witness.   
 
Second, we also considered the relative independence of the investigators.  Both 
Richard Wilson and Andrew Corin maintain professional and/or personal acquaintances 
with members of the ICTY staff and defense teams. Throughout this investigation, 
however, neither has had any affiliation with the ICTY or any other affiliation that would 
affect their neutrality.   
 
A third issue relates particularly to fact-finding in adversarial situations, in which it is 
necessary to ensure that all perspectives and parties are sufficiently represented, 
corresponding to the legal principle of audi alteram partem.  We sought to fulfill this 
requirement in designing the survey, defining the pool of prospective participants, and 
in soliciting and encouraging sufficient participation from all relevant groups of 
prospective participants. 
 
Fourth, we sought to ensure that the appropriate spectrum of fields of expertise was 
consulted. In the direct investigation of war crimes and crimes against humanity, this is 
a necessary, albeit oft-overlooked, condition of objectivity. In the form of meta-
investigation that we were carrying out, focused as it was on a particular topic, it might 
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appear less relevant. However, we judged that it would qualitatively enhance the 
objectivity, and thus also the significance, of our results if we could achieve a balance of 
professional perspectives, both legal and non-legal, among our respondents.  Similarly, 
it may also be noted that the fields of training and experience of the three investigators 
are largely complementary, and include both internal and external perspectives on the 
ICTY.  
 
One limitation to the accessibility of the survey for prospective participants, and thus 
potentially impacting its objectivity, concerns language. While the use of English may 
have limited access for some potential respondents, it eliminated any possibility for 
ambiguous interpretation due to issues of translation. Moreover, as potential 
respondents were highly educated, we judged that the number of such persons lacking 
sufficient knowledge of English would be sufficiently limited so as not to overly skew the 
survey’s results. For the final open-ended question, we invited respondents to provide 
their comments in one of several languages, including those of the former Yugoslavia. 
 
Our greatest challenge arose in compiling the pool of potential participants and securing 
the participation of a sufficient number of respondents. We initially anticipated 
soliciting participation from all members of three groups: staff members of ICTY organs 
(Prosecutor, Chambers, Registry); defense team members; and external experts who 
participated in the ICTY’s work through testimony, public-domain reports, or publicly 
known consultation for the prosecution or defense, including the defense for accused 
from various national/ethnic groups. Our goal was to obtain the broadest possible range 
of perspectives, both legal and non-legal. 
 
Defining a desired pool of participants proved less challenging than securing the 
participation of a sufficient number of such persons. We hoped that the ICTY would 
assist us through the minimal step of informing staff members through e-mail of the 
existence of the survey. This would have ensured access for participants from across the 
 14 
spectrum of roles and perspectives represented in the various organs of the ICTY.  The 
ICTY, however, declined to assist. To avoid any possibility of placing current staff 
members in a delicate position, or inadvertently to jeopardize the confidentiality of 
United Nations information, we ultimately chose to actively solicit the participation only 
of former Tribunal staff members. In the absence of any public domain lists of ICTY staff, 
present or former, we identified names and contact information of potential 
participants through personal recollections, published sources such as the domain ICTY 
Weekly Bulletins for the years 1996-2004, and searches of selected trial transcripts. 
These restrictions severely limited the pool of potential participants from the ranks of 
persons who had served as ICTY staff members. We were ultimately able to secure the 
participation of a sufficient number of erstwhile staff members from the Office of the 
Prosecutor. Responses from former staff members of the Registry and Chambers, 
however, were judged insufficient to allow for significant comparison, and we 
reluctantly excluded them from the analysis. 
 
Securing the participation of defense team members proved less difficult. The 
Association of Defense Counsel maintains a public website with a list of names and 
contact information of members.  This list, together with other information discovered 
through searching other public-domain sources, allowed us to contact a sufficient 
number of defense team members to allow for significant results.  There exists no 
master list of external expert consultants, nor do there exist public-domain witness lists 
for most ICTY cases, so we found ourselves in much the same situation as in regard to 
ICTY staff members. We therefore applied the same methodology and rules to 
identifying these individuals.  Finally, we published a call for participation on the survey 
website, directed to former ICTY staff members, members of defense teams, and expert 
consultants.  In an attempt to achieve a sufficiently large and balanced set of responses 
we received a joint endorsement by both Richard Goldstone, the first Prosecutor of the 
ICTY, and Michael Karnavas, President of the Association of Defense Counsel Practicing 
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Before the ICTY. We published this endorsement on the survey Internet page and 
included it in the prenotification letter that was sent to prospective participants.   
 
In total, 351 email invitations to participate in the survey were sent out.  The largest 
group approached were members of defense teams (201). Another 116 invitations were 
sent to former ICTY staff from the Office of the Prosecutor, Registry and Chambers.  
Finally, we invited 34 consultant experts for the prosecution and defense, most from 
academic institutions in North America and Europe, including the former Yugoslavia. 
The total number of responses collected was 75, indicating a response rate of 21%. Six 
incomplete responses were excluded from the analysis, leaving 69 responses. hat final 
figure was used to calculate a margin of error of 12%.11   
 
There was an approximate parity in responses between members of defense teams (25) 
and staff from the Office of the Prosecutor (31).  Responses from external expert 
consultants (13), although a smaller population, were judged sufficient for inclusion in 
the analysis.  Responses from staff of the Chambers and Registry were insufficient to 
support conclusions, and these categories were excluded from our analysis of the 
results. While recognizing that these numbers are relatively small, we hope that they 
may nevertheless be sufficiently indicative to initiate a scholarly discussion on the uses 
of historical evidence at the ICTY and other international criminal tribunals, and might 
serve as a pilot study for future large-sample surveys.  We decided to report our results 
in percentages rather than raw numbers so as to facilitate comparison between the 
                                                 
11 We calculated Margin of Error (MOE) based on a confidence level of 95% (α=0.05), 
determined as follows: we estimate that the total population of our participants is less than 
10,000, but we used a conservative figure of 20,000 for our estimates.  We assume the response 
distribution to be normal for the data we have collected.  Using N=69, based upon our analysis, 
we find the margin of error to be 11.5 %.  In order to be conservative regarding our inferences, 
we use a MOE of 12% in this study. 
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three main respondent groups—prosecutors, defense attorneys and expert witnesses 
for the defense and prosecution. 
 
 
III.  What is the Legal Relevance of  Historical Evidence? 
 
This section reviews those survey questions directed towards the specifically legal 
motivations for introducing historical evidence in a trial.  In assessing the legal rationales 
for historical inquiry, we begin with the observation that there is no mandate to 
document the prior history of an armed conflict anywhere in the two UN Resolutions 
that established the ICTY in 1993.  Therefore prosecutors and defense attorneys are not 
compelled by a formal mandate to write history, nor should we assume that they are 
necessarily committed to the inherent value of historical reflection for its own sake. 
However, all have an interest in advancing the most persuasive legal argument possible 
and the question becomes whether historical evidence is seen as assisting them in 
achieving that goal. 
 
Our most general survey question on the relevance of history in international criminal 
trials asked survey participants to respond to the statement: “Without historical 
context, individual criminal acts do not appear to make sense.”  A majority of 
respondents (63%) either agreed or strongly agreed, 27% disagreed or strongly 
disagreed, 9% were neutral and 1% expressed no opinion.  Disaggregating the figures 
revealed that prosecutors and defense counsel were equally convinced of the relevance 
of historical context, and they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement at a rate of 
61% and 60% respectively.  These figures indicate a relatively high commitment among 
ICTY legal actors to using historical context to understand alleged crimes.  Furthermore, 
historical evidence is valued equally by all parties in international criminal trials. 
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Widespread consensus between the parties also existed on the question of the type of 
criminal trial that is more likely to include historical evidence.  
 
Which type of criminal trial is more likely to include historical evidence?
80%
1%
8%
11%
International Criminal
Tribunals 80%
Domestic trials in national
justice systems 1%
International and domestic
trials are about the same in
this regard 8%
No opinion 11%
 
Figure 2 
 
This invites the question—what specific features of international criminal legal 
proceedings demand more historical evidence?  We formulated a list of survey 
questions addressing the nature of the crimes committed during the armed conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia that compelled historical inquiry (e.g., their complexity or 
widespread character), and/or whether the need arose more from legal imperatives 
resulting from the categories of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  
ICTY legal actors agreed that the character of the crimes had a strong impact on the use 
of historical evidence and moreover, there were no sharp disagreements between 
defense counsel and prosecutors, whose responses were within 5-7% of one another. 
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.   
When trials at the ICTY include historical evidence, they do so because:
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
The crimes were
committed over a longer
period of time than most
conventional domestic
crimes.
The crimes were more
widespread and systematic
than most conventional
domestic crimes.
The crimes were more
complex than most
conventional domestic
crimes.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
No Opinion
 
Figure 3 
  
However, some strong divisions on the significance of historical elements of the Balkans 
conflict emerged.  One highly controversial debate during the conflict and in the ICTY’s 
trials concerned the degree to which the alleged crimes were motivated by deep 
historical animosities. 
When trials at the ICTY include historical evidence, they do so because the 
crimes committed were motivated by deep historical animosities. 
42%
50%
8%
True
False
No opinion
 
Figure 4 
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Unlike the questions considered thus far, no clear majority view was established.  
Intriguingly, prosecution and defense team members did not diverge widely in their 
responses, agreeing with the question at a similar level (51% and 46% respectively).  
Experts (both the prosecution and defense) overwhelmingly (77%) rejected the “deep 
historical animosities” explanation of the conflict.  It appears that in the minds of ICTY 
actors, the intrinsic attributes of the crimes brought before the ICTY—their complexity, 
their widespread and systematic nature, but not their motivation by a longstanding 
animus—impelled the Tribunal to consider their historical underpinnings.  Our preferred 
explanation/conjecture is that the ambivalence regarding the relevance of “deep 
historical animosities” results from the mixed consequences for criminal responsibility in 
leadership cases.  If the crimes drew from adamantine antipathies, then the prosecution 
could argue that the crimes were foreseeable, intensifying the culpability of leaders that 
made inflammatory speeches or armed their supporters.  On the other hand, historical 
inter-group hatred could support a “chaos defense” whereby leaders were unable to 
restrain spontaneous violence that erupted at the grassroots.  Both positions have been 
extensively argued by both parties in cases heard at the ICTY.12 
 
Turning now to how historical evidence is shaped by the legal requirements contained 
within the categories of international criminal law, the pictured is more mixed than with 
explanations that refer to the nature of the crimes as considered above.  A significant 
majority of participants saw a correlation between the inclusion of historical evidence 
and the collective dimensions of criminal categories such as genocide and persecution. 
                                                 
12 A chaos defense has been a feature in numerous trials of political leaders including Radoslav 
Brđanin, Momčilo Krajisnik, Mido Stanišid and Stojan Župljanin.  The foreseeable consequences 
of actions is a prominent feature of the prosecution indictment against Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadžid presently appearing in the trial chamber. The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžid.  
Prosecution’s Marked-Up Indictment.  With Appendix A. Case IT-95-5/18-PT. 19 October 2009. 
e.g., §10, §39, §43, §50, §59. 
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Prosecutors (77%) were more likely to endorse the view than defense attorneys (60%).  
Expert witnesses showed least support for specifically legal explanations, with only a 
slender majority (53%) in favor.   
When trials at the ICTY include historical evidence, they do so because 
genocide and crimes against humanity have a collective dimension that 
requires a broader historical analysis.
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Figure 5 
 
One unique dimension of international tribunals compared with national justice systems 
is that none of the judges are from the countries where the crimes were committed.    A 
majority (58%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: “Prosecutors lead 
historical evidence in the Trial Chamber to give judges a sense of the motivation for the 
crimes.”  25% disagreed or strongly disagreed, 14% took a neutral position and 3% gave 
no opinion.  Disaggregating the figures revealed a divergence between the prosecution 
and expert witnesses on the one hand and the defense on the other: 73% of prosecutors 
and 69% of expert witnesses agreed or strongly agreed with the statement versus only 
28% of defense attorneys.  One prosecution expert witness reflected at the end of the 
survey, “While those testifying as expert witnesses…come to their task equipped with a 
body of knowledge about the region, its history, language and cultures, the judges and 
those lawyers…in most cases begin their work at the tribunal almost totally uneducated 
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on these matters. From remarks heard in court and encountered in written submissions 
and judgments, one gets the impression that some of the judges and lawyers may still 
be shaky in their grasp of basic facts and background information, even after having 
served on more than one case at the ICTY.” 
 
A number of questions focused on each of the parties to ICTY trials and their specialized 
strategies for using historical evidence.  We felt this to be necessary since, even though 
historical expert witnesses may strive for objectivity and neutrality, they are after all 
included in the process to further the line of argument of one party or the other.13  
Stated plainly, their very presence is a function of the adversarial process of the 
international criminal trial, and this may influence the scope and rationale of the 
historical evidence introduced.  Indeed the survey did turn up assertions of distortion, 
bias and cynical misuse of historical evidence in the ICTY Trial Chamber.  One 
prosecution respondent wrote, “Under the adversarial system, trial lawyers prefer a 
version of history that supports their case (they are not looking for objective (?) truth)…. 
There is a tendency to produce ‘cooked history’.” Defense respondents seemed 
particularly aggrieved: “Testimony by ‘historians’ in many, if not all, of these trials, has 
been used itself to manipulate and mold the view of which ethnic group is bad, 
according to which ethnic group has been the victim.  There is no consistency.  If the 
Muslims are the victims, then the history is manipulated to show that either the Serbs 
or the Croats are the bad guys from an historical perspective, and vice versa.”  
 
Seeking to comprehend prosecutors’ specific reasons for engaging historical expert 
witnesses, the survey asked about the degree have prosecutors used historical evidence 
in the Trial Chamber to assist in creating their theory of the case, where the theory is 
the “particular line of reasoning …(that brings) together certain facts of the case in a 
logical sequence and correlates them in a way that produces in the decision-maker’s 
                                                 
13 Unless called as expert witnesses by the judges, which seldom occurs. 
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mind a definite result or conclusion favored by the advocate.”14  In plainer terms, the 
theory is the overarching story that integrates the “what happened” with the “why it 
happened”—the motives behind what happened.     
 
To what degree have Prosecutors used historical evidence in the Trial Chamber to assist in creating 
their theory of the case?
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A great deal Somewhat Not at all No opinion
 
Figure 6 
 
What particular aspects of the prosecution’s theory of case are being enhanced?  When 
presented with the statement “Prosecutors lead historical evidence in the Trial Chamber 
in order to give a sense of the motivation for the crimes,” 57% agreed or strongly 
agreed, 14% were neutral and 24% disagreed or strongly disagreed, with 3% expressing 
no opinion.  When disaggregated, these figures show a more variegated picture, with 
74% of respondents from the Office of the Prosecutor and 69% of expert witnesses 
(both prosecution and defense) either agreeing or strongly agreeing.  Only 28% of 
defense attorneys agreed and 0% expressed strong agreement.  Therefore we can 
                                                 
14 Black’s Legal Dictionary 2006. 
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conclude that for a sizeable majority of prosecutors surveyed, historical evidence speaks 
to the mental state of the accused, known as mens rea in criminal law. 
 
Reviewing numerous ICTY trial judgments, it is apparent that prosecutors are more likely 
to turn to historical evidence to illustrate the mental state of the accused when 
genocide is charged.  There are specifically legal reasons for this, as proving genocide 
requires the prosecution to demonstrate “special” or “specific” intent, defined as “a 
particular state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall consequence of 
the prohibited act.”15  ICTY prosecutors have struggled to prove special intent to commit 
genocide.  In 2010, 17 years after the ICTY was founded, there is still no standing 
conviction for committing genocide in the former Yugoslavia upheld on appeal.  In cases 
such as Blagojevid, Brđanin, Krstid and Krajišnik, Trial or Appeals Chamber judges found 
that the prosecution had not demonstrated the requisite level of special intent on the 
part of the accused.  Special intent to commit genocide goes well beyond the standard 
intent of most domestic criminal trials and, to use a phrase coined by Trial Chamber 
judges in Stakid, prosecutors must demonstrate a “surplus of intent.”16  In our view, this 
constitutes one of the main reasons why judges did not uphold full-liability genocide 
convictions.17  However, in June 2010 Bosnian Serb Army leaders Vujadin Popovid and 
Ljubiša Beara were found guilty of committing genocide at Srebrenica and Žepa in 
eastern Bosnia, although this has yet to be upheld by the Appeals Chamber.18  One 
survey question directly addressed criminal intent, asking: “Is historical evidence 
                                                 
15 Krstid (Trial Chamber), §571. 
16 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 31 July 2003.  
§520. 
17 We accept there are also other reasons, including the prosecution case against defendants 
appearing before the Tribunal and the available evidence presented thus far.  For an account of 
several cases where the charge of genocide was rejected at the ICTY, see Hayden (2008). 
18 Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popovid et al.  (Case IT-05-88) Trial Chamber Judgment, IT-05-88-T, 10 
June 2010. 
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relevant for proving mens rea in genocide cases; i.e., demonstrating that a perpetrator 
was aware of a wider policy or plan to destroy a group in whole or in part?”19  Our 
expectation was that there would be a strong division between prosecutors sanctioning 
this statement and defense attorneys categorically opposing it, as occurred above in the 
question on motivation for crimes.  Instead there was a statistically significant 
consensus. 
 
Is historical evidence relevant for proving mens rea in genocide cases; i.e., demonstrating that a 
perpetrator was aware of a wider policy or plan to destroy a group in whole or in part? 
(All respondents)
17%
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28%
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Highly relevant (45%)
Somewhat relevant (28%)
Somewhat irrelevant (17%)
Highly irrelevant (4%)
No opinion (5%)
 
Figure 7 
 
Breaking these figures down further showed that respondents from the Office of the 
Prosecutor were more inclined towards viewing historical evidence as highly or 
somewhat relevant for special intent, but not by an overwhelming margin over defense 
counsel or expert witnesses.   
                                                 
19 We neglected to add the words “as such”, as included in the official Genocide Convention.  
While we regret this error, we do not feel that the omission influenced the responses greatly. 
 25 
 
Is historical evidence relevant for proving mens rea  in genocide cases?
(Prosecution, Defense and Expert Witnesses)
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Figure 8 
 
Conceivably as a result of Trial Chamber judgments such as Tadid and the Rule 98bis 
decision in Slobodan Miloševid that confirmed the relevance of historical evidence to 
proving intent to commit crimes against humanity and genocide, this view has now 
become widely acknowledged.  Yet why do defense respondents surveyed see a link 
between history and special intent, given their willingness to object energetically to 
aspects of Tribunal jurisprudence?  We offer some thoughts on this question in our 
conclusions. 
 
 
IV. Assessing the Outcomes of Historical Evidence  
 
In this section we review responses that assess the historical expertise presented at the 
ICTY, the Tribunal’s attitude toward such evidence, and the Tribunal’s utilization of that 
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evidence.    Although the quantifiable survey approach limited the research team to a 
small number of questions with closed answer sets, the final question invited 
respondents to add prose comments of unlimited length, which we will summarize at 
the conclusion of this section. 
 
One series of questions elicited opinions concerning the contribution of experts toward 
the creation of a historical record of the conflicts and their historical context. 
"In their testimony to the ICTY, historians have provided important information on..."
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Figure 9a 
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"In their reports and testimony to the ICTY, historians have provided important information on..." 
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Figure 9b 
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"In their testimony to the ICTY, historians have provided important information on..."
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Prosecution, defense and expert respondents tended to agree with these statements, 
but with two significant limitations.  First, for each question, a larger proportion of 
prosecution respondents than defense respondents agreed.  Second, the extent to 
which prosecution and defense respondents diverged depended on the degree to which 
the questions might relate to the responsibility for inciting conflict and the crimes 
against humanity.  In response to the most general historical questions (1, 6), as well as 
factual questions about the parties to the conflict without reference to ideology or 
intent (4, 5), respondents tended to agree.  Regarding the history and ideology of 
political movements (2), agreement between prosecution and defense diminished.  
Prosecution and expert respondents significantly agreed, while defense responses were 
more evenly split.  On the one question that went directly to the intent of political 
leaders (3), prosecution and defense responses diverged widely. 
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A second group of questions assessed the contribution of the parties in the ICTY 
processes.  First we will consider trial chamber judgments, bearing in mind that the 
evidence provided by historical experts represents just one aspect of that available to 
judges in rendering conclusions of a historiographic nature.  The most general 
evaluation of the historical aspect of the trial chambers’ accounts was elicited by asking 
respondents to react to the statement: “In its judgments, the ICTY has produced an 
accurate and comprehensive account of the armed conflicts of the 1990’s in the former 
Yugoslavia.”  The responses revealed a profound disagreement between defense and 
prosecution respondents: 
 
  Pros.% Defense% Witness% 
Strongly Agree 13 0 23 
Agree 48 16 38 
Neutral 23 16 8 
Disagree 10 48 15 
Strongly Disagree 6 16 15 
Figure 10 
 
A second question sought confirmation of a more limited claim: “In its judgments, the 
ICTY has given important insights into the origins and causes of the armed conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia”.  Although respondents were generally more willing to acknowledge 
the validity of this claim, disagreement remains striking: 
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  Pros.% Defense% Witness% 
Strongly Agree 35 0 15 
Agree 42 32 46 
Neutral 16 12 0 
Disagree 3 20 23 
Strongly Disagree 3 28 8 
No Opinion 0 0 8 
Figure 11 
 
Now we consider the historical expert evidence brought by the prosecution and 
defense.  Two questions sought overall assessments of these contributions:  “Historical 
evidence led by the prosecution/defense has provided important insights into violations 
of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia.” 
 
    Pros.% Defense% Witness% 
(1)  Evidence led by the 
prosecution 
Strongly Agree 55 4 31 
Agree 26 20 23 
Neutral 10 12 8 
Disagree 6 24 15 
Strongly Disagree 3 40 8 
No opinion 0 0 15 
    
(2)  Evidence led by the 
defense 
Strongly Agree 3 8 8 
Agree 29 42 23 
Neutral 29 37.5 15 
Disagree 19 4 15 
Strongly Disagree 3 8 8 
No opinion 16 0 31 
Figure 12 
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The responses revealed a profound yet asymmetrical disagreement along partisan lines.  
Question 1 (concerning evidence led by the prosecution) elicited the most extreme 
divergence of any question in the survey.  In response to Question 2 (evidence led by 
the defense), far more defense respondents agreed than disagreed, but prosecution 
respondents as well tended to agree (albeit by a smaller margin) that defense experts 
had contributed insights into IHL violations.  Speculatively, this asymmetry could reflect 
a belief on the part of some prosecution respondents that bias displayed by defense 
experts from the former Yugoslavia may occasionally reveal a state of mind or historical 
narrative prevalent in the region in line with prosecution contentions. 
 
This concern is related to the issue addressed in two further questions, concerning “the 
degree to which contextual expert witnesses called by the prosecution (a)/defense (b) 
have been appropriately prepared for testimony in the courtroom.”  These questions 
address broader perceptions regarding how adequate the experts for the parties have 
been.  This issue, in turn, arises out of two primary concerns.  The first involves relative 
access to resources, including the best experts available, due to financial, staffing or 
time restrictions, or possibly to fear of stigmatization from appearing for one or the 
other party.  Defense teams have, on multiple occasions, protested a lack of “equality of 
arms” vis-à-vis the prosecution in these respects, while prosecution teams have also 
encountered difficulty in identifying and engaging qualified experts.  The second 
concern has to with experts’ understanding of their role in the process (e.g., neutral vs. 
partisan; to answer questions vs. expounding upon a topic; required documentation). 
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The degree to which contextual expert witnesses called by the prosecution have been appropriately 
prepared for testimony in the courtroom
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Figure 13(a) 
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The degree to which contextual expert witnesses called by the defense have been appropriately 
prepared for testimony in the courtroom
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Figure 13(b) 
 
Prosecution and defense respondents differed asymmetrically on this issue.  Most 
strikingly, while a majority of prosecution respondents felt that prosecution experts had 
been “appropriately prepared,” only 17% of defense respondents believed that their 
own experts had been “appropriately prepared.”  This may reflect the concern of 
defense respondents regarding equality of arms at the ICTY.  Most of those defense and 
prosecution respondents who were willing to offer an opinion about the preparation of 
experts for the other side acknowledged that those experts were at least “somewhat 
prepared,” although a larger proportion of prosecution respondents considered defense 
experts “not appropriately prepared.”  This asymmetry may be interpreted as a form of 
prosecution concurrence with defense respondents’ reluctance to consider defense 
experts as having been “appropriately prepared.” 
 
Three questions evaluated the effectiveness of expertise in terms of its reception by the 
trial chambers.  Two of these questions, “How receptive are ICTY judges to the 
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testimony of historians serving as expert witnesses called by the defense 
(a)/prosecution (b)?,” elicited a striking pattern of asymmetrical differences between 
defense and prosecution respondents.   
 
    Pros.% Defense% Witness% 
A)  Receptivity of ICTY judges 
to defense expert witnesses 
Highly Receptive 0 0 15 
Somewhat 
Receptive 
61 50 46 
Unreceptive 6 21 8 
Highly 
Unreceptive 
0 21 0 
No opinion 32 8 31 
    
B)  Receptivity of ICTY judges 
to prosecution expert 
witnesses 
Highly Receptive 10 33 23 
Somewhat 
Receptive 
71 50 54 
Unreceptive 0 8 0 
Highly 
Unreceptive 
0 0 0 
No opinion 19 8 23 
Figure 14 
 
No respondent from the prosecution or defense acknowledged that judges were highly 
receptive to defense experts.  Remarkably, defense respondents were more likely than 
prosecution respondents to consider judges “Unreceptive” or “Highly Unreceptive” to 
defense experts.  This confirms defense responses indicating that, generally, their 
experts were not as adequately prepared as prosecution experts, which, in turn, follows 
from the defense perception of an “inequality of arms” in the ICTY’s proceedings.  These 
impressions are strengthened by responses concerning judges’ receptivity to 
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prosecution witnesses.  Defense respondents tended to agree with prosecution 
respondents that judges were “Somewhat Receptive” or “Highly Receptive” to 
prosecution expertise.   
 
The sense that defense respondents perceive an overall bias on the part of the Court 
and less adequate preparation of their side’s expert witnesses is further supported by 
responses to a further question: “When the historian expert witnesses of the 
prosecution and defense contradict one another, how do judges decide between their 
competing historical accounts?”   
How Do Judges Decide Between Competing Historical Accounts?
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Prosecution
Defense
Expert Witness
Prosecution 6% 3% 65% 6% 19%
Defense 8% 50% 25% 8% 8%
Expert Witness 0% 15% 62% 0% 23%
Doubt to Defense
Doubt to 
Prosecution
Depends on Case
Avoid 
Determination
No Opinion
Figure 15 
 
This question elicited striking disagreement between prosecution and expert 
respondents, on the one hand, and defense respondents, on the other.  By a wide 
margin, the former felt that this depended on the case.  However, half of the defense 
respondents (a majority of those who offered an opinion) believed that judges generally 
give the doubt to the prosecution. 
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Two questions in True-False format considered speculation regarding motives of the 
prosecution and defense in introducing historical evidence to meet perceived 
weaknesses in their cases: 
 
    Pros.% Defence% Witness% 
A)  Prosecutors lead historical 
evidence when their material 
evidence [e.g., forensics, 
documents] is weak 
True 10 46 23 
False 68 21 38 
No Opinion 23 33 38 
B)  The defense calls 
historians as expert witnesses 
in order to mount a tu quoque 
defense20 
True 48 17 23 
False 13 42 23 
No Opinion 39 42 54 
Figure 16 
 
While we expected the survey to dispel the impression that such views might be 
widespread, it suggested in fact that each is entrenched within one party to the process, 
and that the parties are in striking disagreement with one another in these regards. 
 
A further series of questions addressed additional perspectives bearing on the 
effectiveness of modes of introducing expert evidence. 
 
                                                 
20 As defined at the ICTY, “The defence of tu quoque concerns the allegation that the opposing 
party to the conflict committed similar atrocities” and/or “the allegation that that party was 
responsible for the commencement of the said conflict” (“Decision on Evidence of the Good 
Character of the Accused and the Defence of Tu Quoque,” The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskid et 
al., IT-95-16-T, 17 February 1999).  The admissibility of a tu quoque defense has been generally 
denied in international criminal law since Nuremberg. 
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One asked whether internal OTP staff experts or external experts have been more 
effective.   
Which have been more effective as expert witnesses in the Trial Chamber?
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equally effective
No opinion
 
Figure 17 
 
While a plurality of prosecution respondents considered internal and external experts 
equally effective, half of defense respondents believed that external experts were more 
effective, and few acknowledged internal experts to be more effective.  It is possible 
that some defense respondents used this question as a surrogate for another un-posed 
question which, in retrospect, should therefore have been included: whether it is 
appropriate, in terms of fairness and objectivity, for OTP staff members to appear as 
expert background witnesses.  Some defense attorneys have argued strenuously against 
this practice, including President of the ICTY Defense Attorneys’ Association, Michael G. 
Karnavas: “I have objected to calling expert witnesses from the OTP.  They are not 
independent, but have been part of the prosecution team for years.  They are not going 
to jeopardize their position by going against the case an STA is trying to build.  These 
prosecution analysts-turned-experts are usually engaged in the stages of drafting the 
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indictment, gathering the evidence, and presenting evidence.  Their reports mirror the 
prosecution theory as reflected in the indictment, and one can hardly claim these 
reports to be objective.”21 
 
A second question asked which has greater significance for the outcome of a trial: 
expert testimony led in the Trial Chamber or expert reports submitted to the Trial 
Chamber.  On this question, which does not go to issues that might be considered 
contentious among the parties, all categories of respondent were in essential accord, 
with a majority believing live testimony to have a greater impact.  While reports, with 
their associated documentation, gave the Trial Chambers the ability to analyze experts’ 
positions, underlying arguments and documentation in greater detail and depth, and to 
prepare carefully for oral questioning of experts, respondents nevertheless felt that in 
the end it was the oral testimony of the experts that carried the greatest weight. 
 
A final question addressed one of the most important aspects of the ICTY’s legacy for 
the region of conflict: “Have historical discussions at the ICTY enhanced or undermined 
the Tribunal's legitimacy in the former Yugoslavia?” The results revealed a profound 
difference of perception, with prosecution and defense responses almost diametrically 
opposed.  While a plurality of prosecution respondents (42%) believed the ICTY’s 
legitimacy to have been enhanced by historical discussions at the ICTY, a majority of 
defense respondents (62.5%) believed that the ICTY’s legitimacy had been undermined 
by this discussion.  The smaller number of expert responses was almost evenly divided.  
Most prosecution staff members are from outside the region of the former Yugoslavia 
while a significant number of defense team members are from within the region; it 
remains beyond the scope of the present investigation, however, to determine which 
position is in better accord with public opinion in the various regions of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
                                                 
21 Author interview (Richard Wilson), June 2007. 
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Many respondents availed themselves of the opportunity to add comments, some brief, 
others extensive, in the text field provided at the conclusion of the survey.  We cannot 
capture the full scope and richness of those qualitative comments here, but will note 
several of the issues that were brought to our attention, including some leitmotifs. 
 
Beginning from the more critical comments, some respondents believe the use of 
historical experts to be entirely inappropriate.  One response tied the utilization of 
historical expertise to a flawed prosecution strategy of investigations and prosecutions.  
Instead of taking a pragmatic approach, gathering sufficient evidence to convict 
perpetrators in a rapid and cost effective manner, over-expansive investigations and all-
encompassing indictments have led to  excessively long investigations and trials.  
Another asserted that insufficient time has elapsed since the events for an objective, 
comprehensive and balanced historical account to be compiled. 
 
One recurring perception was that historical expertise has skewed the historical record 
through intentional or inadvertent bias.  On the one hand, two respondents speculated 
that the methodology, conceptual framework (e.g., concept of “nation”) or area of 
interest/specialization of a particular expert may have distorted the results.  On the 
other hand, multiple respondents expressed the view that expert witnesses typically 
favored one side or the other, or were chosen to espouse a favored point of view.  
According to two respondents, the favored view within the Office of the Prosecutor 
might change from one case to the next depending on the ethnic group of the accused, 
while one perceived courtroom historical expertise as having become a continuation of 
the military conflict by other means.    According to one, such effects could be viewed as 
one result of the prosecution strategy of targeting investigation/trial teams for 
particular “perpetrator groups,” rather than for the events of a particular region.  
Another asserted that had the prosecution more effectively employed its in-house 
expertise on the former Yugoslavia and centralized that expertise in the investigative 
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and trial preparation process, a more coherent prosecution position on the history of 
the conflicts would have been achieved.  Yet another suggested that it might have been 
preferable to engage experts not by the two sides, but in a role similar to an amicus 
curiae.    Finally, one respondent noted the inherent limitation on the ability of judges to 
evaluate expert evidence, and of lawyers to evaluate and exploit such evidence, noting 
that both judges and lawyers will prefer simpler solutions, while the latter will favor 
versions that support their particular case.   
 
Multiple comments from respondents who participated for the defense contained 
explicit claims of institutional bias relevant to expertise, including claims that there was 
no equality of arms, a de facto burden of proof on the defense, and that judges gave the 
benefit of the doubt to prosecution experts.  One respondent claimed that an 
accusatorial climate, created and fostered by the prosecution in the former Yugoslavia, 
had chilled the willingness of qualified witnesses to present a historical narrative at odds 
with the prosecution’s.  One defense attorney asserted that the Court’s decision to 
accept hearsay evidence and to basically ignore obvious perjury set the stage for a 
system that could not produce an accurate history of the events and was not likely 
produce justice either.   
 
In contrast to the largely negative perceptions expressed above, a smaller number of 
remarks, in some cases by the same respondents who voiced critical comments, 
affirmed the value of historical (broadly defined) expertise for the success of the ICTY’s 
efforts.  Inter alia, one noted that the employment of expert witnesses has allowed for a 
large body of previously unavailable documentation to be revealed, studied and 
analyzed by experts called by the prosecution and defense for the purpose of these 
trials.  This person added that the use made of this body of evidence by future historians 
may eventually lead to a fuller understanding of these events than one could reasonably 
expect from the expert presentations prepared within the context (and limitations) of 
specific cases before the ICTY.  Another noted that the employment of experts allowed 
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for the inclusion of relevant evidence from outside the former Yugoslavia, e.g., parallel 
examples of the use of mass media to spread falsehoods, so as to provide a perspective 
for better understanding similar events in the Balkans. 
 
We had expected to receive comments asserting the value of expert witnesses in 
educating judges who had no previous experience with events in the former Yugoslavia 
and the history of the region.  However, as cited above, the one comment that touched 
upon this topic asserted that, despite such testimony, some judges and lawyers 
appeared to have an incomplete grasp of basic facts and background information even 
after serving on more than one case at the ICTY; although the evidence of experts can 
be of assistance in remedying this inherent weakness, it can be difficult for the judges to 
sort out conflicting claims by expert witnesses called by the two sides.  Another 
respondent, echoing this same theme, stated that different trial chambers during 
simultaneous trials might reach differing and often opposing conclusions. 
 
V.  Correlation Analysis 
 
We ran correlation tests on our data to determine whether there were any correlations 
between the responses and 1) the length of service at the ICTY; 2) prior knowledge of 
the former Yugoslavia; and 3) prior experience of a criminal justice system.  Given the 
non-parametric nature of our data, we ran a Spearman correlation test to examine the 
relationship between the time of service at the ICTY variable and the rest of the issues 
raised in the survey.22 
 
                                                 
22 In a Spearman test, an ideal +1 or -1 correlation occurs when each of the variables is a perfect 
monotone function of the others. A positive correlation occurs when the significance value is 
smaller than +.05, and a negative correlation occurs when the significant value is smaller than -
.05. 
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While the formal tests resulted in no significant value for the overall survey, the 
following chart that calculates the mean of each question visualizes some disparities 
among the groups based on the length of time they served. In other words, it illustrates 
the relationship between participants’ responses to questions in relation to their length 
of association with the ICTY.  Although Figure 18 aggregates information and tells us 
little about the overall survey, the most significant aspect here is the variation in some 
responses depending on length of association with the Tribunal.  We divided the length 
of association into four categories: 1) those who worked less than one year; 2) those 
who worked from 1 to 2 years; 3) those who worked from 2 to 5 years; and finally 4) 
those who worked for more than 5 years. The numbers on the X axis refer to issues 
raised in the survey (i.e., each question in the survey) while the numbers on the Y axis 
indicate the variation in opinions expressed. The y axis values range between 1 and 5; 
that is, from “strongly agree” to “no opinion.” The same process was applied to Figure 
19, but it included what we considered to be the most controversial questions. 
 
The divide is wider and more obvious between the two groups with the least amount of 
service (“less than 1 year” and “1-2 years” of association) compared with the other two 
groups who served longer (“2-5 years” and “more than 5 years” of association). In other 
words, it does suggest a variation in their responses based on the time variable; 
however, the level of significance varies depending on which groups are being 
compared. Those who worked longer, for example, from 2 to 5 years or longer, 
generally show more agreement upon issues presented in the survey. Major 
disagreements remain between the groups with less than 2 years of service and groups 
with 2 or more years’ involvement.  
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Figure 18:  Responses to All Questions Nos. 10-30 
 
 
Figure 19:  Responses to Selected Questions  
 
Correlation tests were repeated with the other two variables (prior knowledge of the 
former Yugoslavia; and prior experience of a criminal justice system) and the results did 
not show any statistically significant correlations.  While these tests show no 
correlations, they do still indicate something of value — that the replies of individuals 
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with little experience of a criminal justice system or the former Yugoslavia do not differ 
considerably from those of more experienced individuals.  However, participants’ views 
do seem to change substantially by virtue of exposure to the ICTY’s work over time, 
suggesting that socialization in the norms and conventional views of the ICTY is a more 
determining factor in changing opinion than prior experience of legal institutions or the 
region. 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
In contrast to Hannah Arendt’s (1965:91) austere legal minimalism where history is 
deemed not legally relevant, the parties to ICTY trials do have clear legal motivations to 
include historical evidence; that is, they include this type of evidence because it allows 
them to achieve certain legal objectives in the trial. On these issues, there was much 
more consensus between prosecution and defense respondents than on questions 
eliciting evaluation of the outcome of the Tribunal’s historical forays.  In part, this could 
be because the parties share some legal objectives and institutional conditions.  The 
rules of admissibility of evidence in international criminal tribunals grant both parties 
similar latitude in developing their cases.  Both parties appear before international 
judges who, at least in the beginning, require historical and cultural contextualization to 
make sense of the evidence.  Prosecutors and defense attorneys perceive the actual 
crimes similarly (as “widespread and systematic”, as “complex”) and accept the same 
categorical imperative to use historical evidence.  This consensus on the repercussions 
of the crimes for the legal process continues when the questions turn to the legal 
conceptions of international criminal law itself.  There is strong agreement that the 
collective dimension of crimes against humanity affects the use of historical evidence.   
 
Despite these areas of agreement, however, historical evidence clearly assumes a 
distinct legal relevance for each party in the adversarial process.  This is perhaps to be 
expected, as Marc Galanter (1974:97) described some time ago the different legal 
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strategies adopted by “one-shotters” and “repeat players” as they played the “litigation 
game.”23  At the ICTY, prosecutors are more likely to occupy the “repeat player” end of 
the continuum, taking advantage of the benefits that accrue (e.g., expertise, advance 
intelligence etc).   Prosecutors are using historical evidence to build their theory of a 
case and to demonstrate the criminal intention of the accused, especially in cases where 
they must prove special intent to commit genocide.  In qualitative interviews conducted 
before this survey, it became apparent that some prosecutors saw in historical evidence 
the opportunity to demonstrate how a nationalist ideology (e.g., Greater Croatia, 
Greater Serbia) engendered an enduring desire to hold a particular territory or 
subordinate another ethnic/national group within a state or territory.   
 
The fact that a majority of defense counsel were willing to subscribe to the potential link 
between history, mental state and genocide invites further discussion, since this would 
appear to be against their clients’ interests.  Certainly, history is of greater intrinsic 
concern to the accused than the prosecutors, and historical treatises in the courtroom 
seem to play well with an audience back in the region (Tosid 2007).  Perhaps defense 
attorneys perceive an opportunity to support a “chaos defense,” or, conversely, to 
undercut prosecution arguments that there was a long-standing desire on the part of 
nationalists to commit genocide.   Or perhaps, given that sentencing and judgment 
occur simultaneously at the ICTY, they see an opportunity to demonstrate how any 
attacks constituted justifiable reprisals in response to past provocations.  Presenting the 
history of nationalist ideology in the former Yugoslavia, then, may assist the prosecution 
and the defense cases, albeit in different ways.  It helps prosecutors develop their case 
theory and elaborate their narrative on genocidal intent, but it also allows defense to 
lead evidence that may sew uncertainty regarding issues of ideology and superior 
responsibility. 
 
                                                 
23 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the relevance of Galanter’s ideas to 
interpreting the survey results. 
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Turning now to responses that assess the historical accounts produced or presented at 
the ICTY, and their reception both at the ICTY and in the former Yugoslavia, one striking 
generalization stands out.  On questions that concern the fairness/objectivity of the 
ICTY’s process, judges’ receptivity to evidence, and the accuracy, objectivity and 
comprehensiveness of the historical accounts created at the ICTY, prosecution and 
defense responses diverged widely.  . 
 
If the broader “chapeau” goals of the ICTY have been to promote reconciliation in the 
former Yugoslavia and deter future conflict by providing accountability that is perceived 
in the region to be fair and objective, and which is so well documented that it will be 
resistant to later revisionism, then the results of this survey do not bear out these wider 
goals.  While parties to an adversarial process must vigorously advocate their respective 
positions in individual cases, for these goals to be achieved, then the parties must 
approach, at least gradually, a common understanding on issues relating to 
effectiveness and fairness of the process itself.  Yet, this survey suggests that over more 
than 15 years of ICTY practice, at least in matters related to historical inquiry, the parties 
have not achieved such a common ground which could form a strong basis for 
acceptance of the Tribunal’s work in the regions of conflict.  If we speculate that those 
views which are preponderant among defense respondents reflect opinions that are 
widespread in the former Yugoslavia, then we must conclude the Tribunal’s legacy in 
that region, at least in regard to the historical record that it has created, will not be a 
salient one.  We must also conclude that the ICTY’s international legacy as a pioneering 
institution of international justice will be diminished at least in this regard.   
 
Ultimately, the multifarious historical accounts created within the framework of the 
ICTY will be available for evaluation by future generations of researchers, and will not 
stand or fall on the basis of assessments by the immediate participants in the trials.  The 
ICTY’s contribution to historical inquiry into the recent conflicts, moreover, will be but 
one of many.  As articulated by one expert witness: 
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“The process of international criminal justice at the ICTY, and the 
testimony and evidence that it has produced has added significantly to 
the available historical evidence concerning events in the former 
Yugoslavia during the final decades of the 20th century. The use made of 
this body of evidence by future historians may eventually lead to a fuller 
understanding of the critical questions about these events than one could 
reasonably expect from the expert presentations prepared within the 
context (and limitations) of specific cases before the court.” 
 
Reviewing the results of the survey, we see some clear implications for the extant 
literature on the ICTY’s ability to facilitate reconciliation among the population of the 
former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular.  The edited volume by 
Stover and Weinstein (2004) offers a number of examples (e.g., Mostar and Prijedor in 
Bosnia and Vukovar in Croatia) in support of its contention that international trials have 
little impact on reconciliation and social reconstruction.  Subotid (2009:6) finds evidence 
to support these claims in her elucidation of how political actors in Bosnia, Croatia and 
Serbia often hijack the ICTY’s work for their own domestic agenda, thus jeopardizing the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the international justice institution.24   Kostid (2007:355) 
concludes that “in the case of persisting group insecurities and ethnonational 
mobilization, different ethnonational communities, instead of wholeheartedly 
embracing justice and truth from international or hybrid tribunals, are more likely to 
view them selectively and on the basis of their particular definition of war, defenders 
and perpetrators.”  From this perspective, the expectation that the ICTY can promote 
reconciliation, at least in the near term, by establishing an accurate historical account 
that is acceptable to all and resistant to revisionism may itself be misplaced. 
 
                                                 
24 See also Klarin (2009) which also assesses the ICTY’s Outreach Program. 
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Our research shows that the international criminal proceedings, based as they are in the 
adversarial process, may enhance an oppositional mentality, polarize historical accounts 
further and widen the chasm rather than construct a common bridge between 
populations.  However, we note more recent attitudinal research in Bosnia by 
Nettelfield (2010) challenging the emerging negative consensus.  Lara Nettelfield claims 
that previous scholars have overlooked the ways in which the ICTY has promoted 
democratization and, if not exactly “reconciliation”, then at least the internalization of 
basic human rights norms, by creating new post-war political identities based on the 
rule of law and participation (p.15).  Our view is that these questions are temporally 
defined, and the impact of the ICTY on reconciliation, rule of law and historical denial in 
the former Yugoslavia cannot be fully known until some years after its work is complete.  
We would observe at this point that the fact that the actual legal proceedings at the 
ICTY seem to push the actors further apart on central historical issues does not bode 
well for the ICTY’s legacy.   
 
Nevertheless, the contribution of the ICTY is unique and non-replicable in its 
methodology, access to information, and in the nature of its products.  It is also 
distinctive in its potential to positively or negatively affect reconciliation and historical 
debate in the public spaces in the regions of conflict.  It is for both of these reasons that 
we have attempted to contribute to the project of assessing its successes and failures. 
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